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n their paper, Hoover and Jordá have tackled a
very difficult task: the analysis of the effect of
systematic monetary policy. As the paper’s
critical review of the literature outlines, during the
last several decades the literature has focused
almost exclusively on the effects of unanticipated
monetary shocks rather than on the effects of sys-
tematic monetary policy. Hoover and Jordá argue
that this exclusive focus should be altered, that
monetary analysis should also study the effects of
systematic monetary policy.
The second half of the paper offers new
methods and results for the analysis of monetary
effects. Hoover and Jordá propose a new way to
identify the relative effects of anticipated versus
unanticipated monetary policy in the context of
Cochrane’s (1998) mixed model. They then use
the estimates to analyze the implications for
systematic monetary policy.
This paper deals with many subtle issues of
identifying monetary policy. Because an understand-
ing of the subtleties is essential for appreciating
the contribution of this paper, I will first review the
identification issues involved. I will then expand
on Hoover and Jordá’s arguments for why we
should study the effects of systematic monetary
policy. Focusing on the second half of their paper,
I will analyze Hoover and Jordá’s new procedure
and then finish by assessing its strengths and
weaknesses.
IDENTIFYING THE SEPARATE 
EFFECTS OF ANTICIPATED VERSES
UNANTICIPATED MONETARY POLICY
Sargent (1976) first pointed out that without
additional information, one cannot separately
identify the effects of anticipated versus unantici-
pated monetary policy. The problem is that many
different theories of the effects of monetary policy
are consistent with the history of monetary policy,
as captured by a vector autoregression (VAR). Thus,
without further identifying assumptions, a VAR can
only reveal the effect of a monetary shock if it is
followed by the usual policy actions.
It is useful to consider two polar cases and an
intermediate case:
• Polar Case 1: Only unanticipated money
matters.
This is the case usually assumed (implicitly)
in the VAR literature. If only unanticipated
money matters, the impulse response func-
tion (IRF) reveals the structural coefficients
of the model. Furthermore, the impulse
response function is invariant to changes in
monetary regimes. Why is this the case?
Because none of the propagation of a mon-
etary shock to output operates through the
subsequent effect on anticipated money, the
effects do not depend on the coefficients of
the monetary feedback rule.
• Polar Case 2: All money matters equally.
In this case, the coefficients in the regression
of output, y, on money, m, and its lags are
invariant to changes in the policy rule. This
result occurs because a unit increase in
money always has a certain effect on output,
regardless of whether the increase was
caused by a monetary shock or a systematic
increase in money. The impulse response
function, however, is not invariant to changes
in the policy rule. If policy changes so that
movements in money become more persis-
tent, the response of output will be different.
• Intermediate Case: Anticipated and unan-
ticipated money matter differently.
This middle case is the most difficult case to
analyze because nothing from the VAR is
invariant to policy. Without further identi-
fying information, it is hopeless to try to
distinguish the two types of effects.
WHY STUDY THE EFFECTS OF 
SYSTEMATIC MONETARY POLICY?
Until recently, most researchers were content to
examine only the effects of unanticipated monetary
shocks because they assumed that systematic mone-
tary policy does not matter. As pointed out above,
impulse response functions from the VAR are the
natural method for analyzing these effects because
they are invariant to changes in policy regimes.
Why have Hoover and Jordá, as well as a few
papers in the recent literature, decided to tackle
the very difficult problem of analyzing systematic
policy? I would argue that there are four key
reasons.
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The first reason is the realization in the last
decade that shocks to monetary policy do not
explain much of the variance of output (e.g.,
Cochrane, 1994). Many researchers have strong
prior beliefs that money matters a lot. In order to
reconcile that belief with the small role of shocks,
one must naturally turn to systematic monetary
policy as a candidate.
The second reason is the realization of the
potential role of systematic monetary policy as a
propagation mechanism. By ignoring the possible
systematic effects of monetary policy we may be
inappropriately attributing its effects to other
variables. For example, Bernanke, Gertler, and
Watson (1997) argue that many of the observed
effects of oil on the economy may be due to the
endogenous response of monetary policy to oil
shocks.
The third reason that the literature has become
more open to the idea that systematic monetary
policy is important is the great amount of recent
research on the importance of monetary policy
rules. If systematic monetary policy has no effects,
then there is little point in debating the merits of
various rules, except for the central bank’s role in
price stabilization.
Finally, as Cochrane (1998) points out, if only
unanticipated monetary policy matters, then “the
striking similarity of the output and monetary re-
sponses is a pure and unlikely coincidence” (p. 295).
Figure 1 shows the response of the log of indus-
trial production and the log of M2 to a shock to
M2.1 Output and money follow very similar paths
in the first few years after a shock. If we believe
that only unanticipated money matters, then we
should not expect such similarities in the path.
The similarities displayed offer incriminating evi-
dence that part of the impact of money on output




Hoover and Jordá offer a very clever idea for
distinguishing the effects of anticipated versus
unanticipated money. They begin with Cochrane’s
hybrid model, which is a “structural” model that
allows anticipated money to matter. The hybrid
equation is as follows:
yt=λA(L) E(mt|Ωt–1)+A(L)[mt–E(mt|Ωt–1)]+B(L)εwt ,
where εwt is a vector of orthogonalized non-
monetary innovations, which includes the output
innovation. The first term captures the effect of
anticipated money and the second term captures
the effect of unanticipated money. If λ=0, then
only unanticipated money matters. If λ=1, there
is no distinction between anticipated and unantici-
pated money. If λ is between 0 and unity, then
unanticipated and anticipated money matter, but
they matter differently.
Cochrane gives no economic interpretation
of λ, but Hoover and Jordá suggest one. They
suggest that λ be interpreted as the fraction of
nonrational agents in the economy, much as
Campbell and Mankiw (1989) interpreted a com-
parable coefficient in their study of consumption
behavior. I will discuss the plausibility of this
interpretation below.
The identification problem is best seen by
considering the relationship between the
structural parameters λ and the parameters of A(L)
on the one hand and the coefficients from the
reduced-form moving-average representation
(MAR) of the VAR on the other. The MAR is given
by equations (18) and (19) of the paper, which are
shown here:
Figure 1
Response of Output and M2 to an M2 Shock









1 The impulse response functions are computed from a VAR with
industrial production, the consumer price deflator, and M2, all in
logarithms. The VAR has 12 lags and is estimated over the period
1960:1–1999:12.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS




The relationship between the structural coef-
ficients and the MAR coefficients is given by
equation (26) of the paper. Here is the first set of






(The rest of the equations in equation (26) involve
the coefficients such as cyy0, cyw0, etc. and the b’s
from the polynomial B(L).) Consider the algebra
behind the identification problem. The c coeffi-
cients are estimated from the MAR of the VAR and
thus can be treated as “known” for the purposes
of identification. Given the c’s, can we back out the
λ and a’s? No. Inspection of the equations shows
that the number of equations is greater than the
number of unknowns: there are k+1 equations in
k+2 unknowns. Adding the remaining equations
in the system does not solve the problem.
Because the system is not identified without
further assumptions, Cochrane only analyzes what
the effects of monetary policy would be if λ took
on various values. Hoover and Jordá, in contrast,
tackle the identification problem head-on.
Hoover and Jordá solve the identification
problem by making assumptions that allow them
to convert this system of algebraic equations into
a system of regressions. Rather than solve alge-
braically for the λ, a’s, and b’s, they instead figure
a way to estimate them. The required assumptions
are as follows:
1. The monetary policy regime switches at
least once during the sample, so there are at
least two sets of MAR coefficients (the c’s).
2. λ is invariant to switches in monetary policy
regimes.
3. A(L) and B(L) are invariant to switches in
monetary policy regime.
4. Anticipated and unanticipated shocks are
propagated by the same mechanism: A(L).
To see how these assumptions solve the identi-
fication problem, rewrite the equations in system







I have added t subscripts on the c coefficients be-
cause now they are treated as variables (with at
least two observations). I have also added error
terms, µ, which I will discuss shortly.
Now, identification becomes much easier. In
fact, the system is recursive. The first equation
regresses cym0,t on cmm0,t and produces a regression
coefficient estimate for a0. With an estimate of a0
from the first equation, one can then use the re-
gression given in the second equation to estimate
λ and a1. One can estimate each of the a’s recur-
sively. In short, Hoover and Jordá identify the
structural parameters by turning a system of alge-
braic equations into a system of regressions.
To implement the idea, Hoover and Jordá use
the following procedure. They begin with the
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) VAR to
describe monetary policy and its effect on the
economy. Hoover and Jordá use Bai-Perron tests
for structural breaks on the monetary reactions
function (the federal funds rate [FFR] equation in a
Christiano et al. system). The test statistics favor
two breaks, but they choose five breaks since the
test statistic is almost as high and it gives more
observations for each c in the system above. In the
next step, they estimate the entire VAR separately
on each regime, taking regime breaks as given.
This step yields six sets of estimates of the MAR
coefficients.
They then treat each MAR coefficient as a
variable with six observations to create the set of
regressions outlined above. They use a minimum-
distance estimator to estimate λ and the parameters
of A(L) and B(L), imposing the nonlinear cross-
equation restrictions.
This procedure yields several surprising results.
First, λ is estimated to be 0.57 with a standard
error of 0.14! This estimate of λ is eerily similar to
Campbell and Mankiw’s (1989) estimate of the
fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers. Are we to
believe that Hoover and Jordá’s nonrational agents
and Campbell and Mankiw’s rule-of-thumb con-
sumers are one and the same?142 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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A second result, which is not so surprising, is
that the response of money to a shock depends
significantly on the value of λ. This result confirms
what Cochrane found when he analyzed monetary
policy under different assumptions about λ. The
response of output to an unanticipated shock
becomes smaller as λ rises because we attribute
more and more of the subsequent response of out-
put to lagged anticipated money, which also changes
in response to the initial unanticipated shock.
Perhaps the most surprising result is the analy-
sis of monetary policy over the various regimes.
Hoover and Jordá find a wide variety of responses
of monetary policy to real shocks over the different
regimes. Among the more curious results found
are the estimates that imply that Volcker was much
more of an inflation dove than Burns-Miller and
Greenspan. These results are difficult to interpret.
CRITIQUE 
While I think that the Hoover and Jordá identi-
fication method is a clever device that can probably
be used in a variety of contexts, I think that there
are several weaknesses of this particular imple-
mentation. These weaknesses lead me to question
the robustness of the empirical results.
My first concern is that the authors are
applying a very clever idea to a very shaky founda-
tion. I am uncomfortable with their interpretation
of the Cochrane hybrid model as a model with a
certain fraction of nonrational agents. Abandon-
ing Lucas’s idea that only unanticipated money
matters does not mean we must abandon rigorous
methodology as well. We should be serious about
deviations from rational expectations. There is an
important area of literature that studies learning
and adaptive behavior. Some of the more realistic
models are those with agents that have bounded
rationality but which display active cognition.
In a serious model of bounded rationality, we
would expect λ to change when the monetary
regime changes. In particular, we might expect λ
(the fraction of nonrational agents) to rise immedi-
ately after the shift in a monetary regime because
it is difficult to form rational expectations when
the structure of the economy has suddenly shifted.
I am also concerned about the plausibility of
some of the other identifying assumptions. One
key assumption is that the lag structure coefficients
for both anticipated and unanticipated money are
the same, even though they are assumed to have
different effects on the economy. Why would we
expect them to have the same lag structure in
the propagation mechanism? In short, a better
structural model would help us assess the reason-
ableness of the identifying assumptions.
Identifying assumptions aside, there are other
aspects of the implementation that cast some
doubt on the precision of the results. First, as
acknowledged by Hoover and Jordá, the true
standard error on λ is probably much higher than
0.14. That standard error is based on an estima-
tion method that assumes that the c’s are known,
rather than estimated. In fact, they are estimated.
Moreover, some of the sets of c’s are estimated over
sample periods with very few observations. For
example, for the monetary regime from 1978:6 to
1982:3, they use 46 observations to estimate 25
VAR parameters. It’s no wonder that monetary
policy looks so different across regimes: the sam-
pling error must be very large. A related concern is
the source of the error terms introduced into the
system when it is converted from an algebraic
system to a regression system. The authors talk
about “computational errors,” but can we be certain
that these errors have the properties required for
consistency of the estimates?
Another reason we might not have much con-
fidence in the results is that there are no tests of
over-identifying restrictions. It seems it would be
preferable to incorporate the notion of regime
changes directly in the structural model in order
to derive the implications. One could then estimate
the six sets of MAR coefficients jointly with λ,
A(L), and B(L), using the theoretical restrictions.
A final quibble is the point that finding five
breaks using the Bai-Perron test does not imply six
different regimes. In principle, monetary policy
could be switching back and forth between two
distinct regimes.
Given these potential concerns, it seems that
it would be good for the authors to test a more
straightforward implication of their model—one
that does not require so many identifying restric-
tions. As discussed above, if λ is equal to unity,
meaning that there is no distinction between
anticipated and unanticipated money, the coef-
ficients on money in the output equation are
invariant to regime shifts. The advantage of
setting λ equal to unity as the null hypothesis is
that in this case it is natural to believe that the A(L)
coefficients are the same across anticipated and
unanticipated money. 
Thus, as a first pass, one could use the followingFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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procedure. First, test the set of coefficients in the
money equation for stability. If stability is rejected,
then there is evidence of monetary regime shifts.
Conditional on the regime switch, a test of the
stability of the coefficients on money in the output
equation is a test of λ equal to unity.
In order to illustrate this procedure, I estimated
a VAR with the log of employment, log of M2, and
log of the consumption deflator. The VAR contains
seven lags. I use two breaks, which implies three
regimes, because this is the result with the highest
sup F in the Bai-Perron test. The first regime extends
from 1960:1 to 1978:5, the second from 1978:6 to
1982:3, and the third from 1982:4 to 1999:1.
The results of Chow tests on the coefficients in
the money equation versus the output equation are
given in Table 1. Table 1 shows that the Chow test
supports the Bai-Perron test of a structural break in
the monetary policy reaction function. In contrast,
one cannot reject stability of the coefficients on
money in the output equation. These results suggest
that the data are not at odds with the assumption
that anticipated and unanticipated money matter
equally. Of course, these results need to be tested
in more complicated systems, but, if they hold up,
they have important implications for the analysis
of monetary policy.
CONCLUSIONS 
Hoover and Jordá set their sights on an ambi-
tious goal when they decided to analyze the effects
of systematic monetary policy. In trying to analyze
this problem, they have introduced a clever new
identification technique. While I have raised con-
cerns about several aspects of the implementation,
the paper nonetheless makes two important con-
tributions. First, it provides further support for the
importance of shifting the research agenda to ana-
lyzing systematic monetary policy. Second, the
potential contribution of their new technique is
not limited to this particular implementation.
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